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In Syria’s rebel-held Idlib province, residents have established 
local governance bodies that provide needed services and 
simultaneously pose a political challenge to the regime of 
Bashar al-Assad. No overarching authority has replaced the 
state after it was forced from Idlib. Islamist and jihadist armed 
groups hold power at the local level, and have developed 
relatively sophisticated service coordination bodies. Yet 
ultimate decision-making power has typically sat with donor 
organizations outside the country. Localism and wartime 
conditions have also frustrated attempts to unify and rationalize 
service and governance in Idlib. Syrian rebels wanted Idlib to 
demonstrate an alternative to Assad’s rule, but their eﬀ orts 
have been stymied by internal rivalries and problematic 
relationships between local rebel administrators inside Syria 
and international sponsors abroad. Idlib’s trajectory mirrors the 
wider dynamics of Syria’s war and fragmented opposition.
___________________________________________
As the regime of Bashar al-Assad recaptured strategic 
sections of insurgent-controlled Syria in 2016, Syria’s rebel-
held Idlib province increasingly became the heart of the 
uprising in the north of the country, the dynamic center of 
the armed opposition. As the sole province almost entirely 
under rebel control, Idlib emerged as a key proving ground 
for Syria’s rebels as they sought to demonstrate how they 
would govern Syria’s “liberated” areas.
The Assad regime has staked its claim to legitimacy in large 
part on the continuity of its state institutions, including 
normal municipal services. Opposition governance and 
service provision in Idlib and elsewhere have thus posed a 
direct challenge to regime authority. Yet governance and 
public services in Idlib have also become another space 
for intra-opposition competition. Nascent civilian bodies 
have contended for resources and public support, but they 
have also been joined by major rebel factions and service 
institutions linked to armed groups.
The Syrian opposition has remained broadly united by 
its resistance to the Assad regime. But an examination of 
opposition governance in Idlib shows how civilian and 
military elements of the opposition, in parallel with their 
ongoing war against the regime, have engaged in a lower-
key struggle behind the lines to secure infl uence and defi ne 
the political order for which they’re fi ghting.
The dislocating eff ects of Syria’s war and a mechanism for 
international assistance that coordinates directly with local 
authorities have together produced a fragmented Idlib, 
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administered by more than a hundred city- and town-level 
bodies, known as local or municipal councils. These miniature 
governments have provided the basic services that have 
maintained some minimum quality of life in Idlib’s opposition 
communities, including utilities repairs, sanitation, sales of 
subsidized bread, and relief distribution. They have also 
served as an experiment in participatory government after 
decades of authoritarian control and, in theory, a center of 
popular legitimacy independent of both the Assad regime 
and armed factions.
Armed Factions Step In
The uneven performance of the local and municipal councils, 
their inconsistent foreign backing, and the lack of any supra-
local organizing framework have provided an opening for 
service bodies linked to armed groups. Idlib’s two main 
Islamist or jihadist factions, the Fateh al-Sham Front and 
Ahrar al-Sham, have backed service bodies that compete 
with each other as well as with civilian bodies supported by 
foreign donors, like the Idlib Provincial Council.
In the city of Idlib (the capital of the province), Ahrar al-
Sham and Fateh al-Sham have also jointly established an 
alternative to the purely civilian local council model, a civilian 
service administration under a council of armed factions.
According to local observers in Idlib Province, these bodies 
with links to armed groups have aimed at either rationalizing 
Idlib’s governance and services sector or magnifying their 
respective factional backers’ infl uence on the ground. But 
none have been perfectly successful, in part because of the 
impossibility of restoring normal civic life under periodic, 
indiscriminate aerial bombing, and these bodies’ own limited 
resources and capacity.
MAP CREDIT: AGATHOCLE DE SYRACUSE. LABELS ADDED BY AUTHOR. 
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The local councils, as the main vector for international 
support, have been made the focus of an assortment of 
Syrian parties interested in steering external assistance. 
Constituencies such as powerful local families have 
attempted to coopt or replace local councils and thus shape 
civic life in their communities, as have armed groups, both 
through linked service bodies and as individual hometown 
rebels.
“If you’re not a guy with a gun or backed up by someone with 
a gun, then your connection to power is through assistance,” 
said one Western development worker, interviewed on 
condition of anonymity because he is not authorized to 
speak publicly.1
But it is often international relief organizations, charities, and 
development contractors based outside Syria’s borders that 
wield ultimate control over assistance inside the country, 
and which armed groups and other actors have learned to 
operate with and around. The result is a rebel territory that 
is simultaneously atomized and bound up in overlapping, 
tangled relationships of influence and control between 
local service bodies, influential clans, armed groups, and 
international organizations.
Rebel-held Idlib is a showcase for how rebels can pursue 
influence in nonmilitary spaces, as they reverse-engineer 
international aid dynamics and, through relatively 
sophisticated administrative structures, compete with each 
other for legitimacy. It also demonstrates how, in a civil 
conflict, even seemingly mundane municipal services like 
trash disposal and road repairs can be inseparable from issues 
of political and military control. The civilian and military 
opposition in Idlib had hoped to create a revolutionary 
alternative to the Syrian state under the Assad regime. 
In important ways, they have fallen short. But the service 
bodies and administrations they have built have shown 
how insurgents can challenge an incumbent regime’s claims 
to state legitimacy; how they can construct functioning, 
participatory government, even amid an ongoing civil war; 
and how they can invest those efforts to win local legitimacy.
This report is based on more than two dozen interviews 
conducted in person in Turkey and over WhatsApp with 
Syrians inside Idlib in May, July, August, September, and 
October 2016, as well as a review of relevant Syrian press and 
social media. Interviewees included Western development 
workers and Syrian activists, rebels, humanitarian workers, 
and officials involved in local governance and service 
provision. Restrictive border measures taken by the Turkish 
government and the security situation inside Idlib mean that 
access to Idlib is limited. Dangers include aerial bombing, 
but also the threat of kidnapping by entrepreneurial criminals 
and some of the groups referenced in this report. With 
some exceptions, independent Western researchers and 
journalists can no longer safely work inside Idlib province. 
This report instead relies on interviews conducted remotely, 
including with local council officials contacted through their 
councils’ Facebook pages, or through in-person meetings 
in neighboring Turkey. This report aims to be transparent 
about its sources and methods, and its assertions should be 
considered in light of the limitations on qualitative research 
inside Idlib and the rest of northern Syria.
Revolutionary Idlib
Even before Syria’s uprising, Idlib province was marginalized, 
rural, and poor. The mountainous northwestern province, 
which shares a long border with Turkey’s Hatay, depended 
primarily on agriculture, including olive crops. Idlib’s people 
were largely conservative Sunnis, with small Druze, Shia and 
Christian minorities. Yet the province was denied the political 
attention and investment given to other peripheral Sunni-
majority provinces. That, coupled with lingering resentment 
over the Syrian government’s 1980s crackdown on Islamists 
(many of them Idlibis), helped ensure the province became 
a hotbed for opposition.2
Idlib joined nationwide protests against the Assad regime in 
spring 2011 and became, from summer 2011, an early bastion 
of the country’s armed insurgency. The Syria uprising’s first 
major armed confrontation between proto-rebels and the 
regime’s security services and military took place in the 
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western Idlib town of Jisr al-Shughour in June 2011. (At the 
time, these fighters seem to have just been armed locals.) 
Jabal al-Zawiyah, a mountainous section of southern Idlib, 
served as a key early base for insurgents and nascent rebel 
factions, some of which would subsequently become some 
of the most powerful brigades in the country.
The regime’s security forces and paramilitary auxiliaries 
initially managed to suppress opposition in the province’s 
main urban centers, including the city of Idlib, Ariha, and Jisr 
al-Shughour. Yet they progressively lost their hold on the Idlib 
countryside, including the western border strip with Turkey 
and, in summer 2012, the Bab al-Hawa border crossing. By 
2014, the regime was confined to a few reinforced cities and 
towns and a set of fortified but mostly encircled military 
bases.
In December 2014, rebels overran one of the most important 
and stubborn of those bases, Wadi al-Deif. Then, in March 
2015, the newly announced Army of Conquest coalition 
seized the provincial capital. The Army of Conquest, which 
was led by the Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham and included 
several other factions, then swept south, taking the regime’s 
remaining bases and the towns of Ariha and Muhambal. 
Separately, another rebel coalition made mostly of the same 
factions took the crossroads city of Jisr al-Shughour in Idlib’s 
southwest corner in April 2015. From there, rebels joined up 
and pushed into the Ghab Plain in Hama, the next province 
to the south, menacing the regime’s coastal strongholds and 
apparently prompting Russia’s intervention later that year on 
behalf of the regime. With the exception of two loyalist Shia 
towns stranded and besieged in northern Idlib, the province 
has been entirely rebel-held ever since.
As rebel-held territory in neighboring Aleppo province has 
been broken and bisected by a 2016 Russian-backed regime 
offensive, the rebel north has mostly been reduced to Idlib 
and contiguous sections of adjacent Lattakia, Hama, and 
Aleppo provinces. For all of Idlib and its environs, the only 
outlets to Turkey are, officially, the Bab al-Hawa crossing, run 
by a nominally civilian administration controlled in practice 
by Ahrar al-Sham; and several smaller unofficial crossings 
used for humanitarian purposes, including the Khirbet al-
Jouz crossing. There are also unofficial smuggling routes 
along the length of Idlib’s western border with Turkey, mostly 
controlled by the Fateh al-Sham Front.
In October 2014, the Nusra Front and a smaller, hyper-
extreme Nusra splinter called Jund al-Aqsa led a campaign 
to destroy a number of nationalist Free Syrian Army (FSA) 
factions in Idlib and Hama.3
Since then, Ahrar al-Sham and the Fateh al-Sham Front have 
been the twin dominant factions in Idlib. They have also, 
according to Idlib locals, been locked in a mostly bloodless 
contest for control across the province.4
A number of other, smaller factions have swum in their 
wake, including local FSA brigades and several Islamist and 
jihadist factions. Idlib’s FSA was, by 2016, a largely spent 
force. Many of its factions are seen to operate under the 
effective protection of Ahrar al-Sham, which has intellectual 
and organizational roots in al-Qaeda-style transnational 
jihadism but has abandoned jihadism’s commitment to 
universal, unending war in favor of a narrowly Syrian focus 
and a more populist, inclusive approach, an approach I have 
previously termed “revisionist jihadism.” Ahrar al-Sham has 
aligned itself with the FSA rebel mainstream, while carefully 
cultivating a separate, more militant identity.5
The rise of Islamist and jihadist rebels in Idlib has been 
accompanied by the imposition of Islamic law (of varying 
degrees of harshness) and conservative social norms. Many 
of Idlib’s religious minorities have fled. Jihadists obliged 
Druze towns to convert to Sunni Islam en masse. In one 
instance, Druze villagers were massacred.6 The province’s 
two holdout Shia towns have been encircled and periodically 
attacked as a tool of rebel pressure on the regime and its 
allies. The Assad regime, for its part, has been happy to 
hold up Idlib as the alternative to regime control in its own 
messaging.
Idlib province’s residents numbered rough two million 
in mid-2016, according to one Syrian relief worker who 
agreed to speak on condition of anonymity,7 including an 
estimated 700,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) from 
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across Syria.8 They have had to get by in a half-functional 
war economy sustained in large part by international relief. 
Living conditions in Idlib were better in 2016 than they had 
been in 2013 or 2014, said the relief worker, “but not like a 
developed country.”
Some areas enjoy interrupted grid water and electricity. 
In many others, electricity is provided by privately owned 
generators for which residents pay subscriptions, and water 
is sold from tanker tanks. Residents work in small businesses, 
construction, smuggling. Many also work in agriculture, 
including on farmlands seized by Ahrar al-Sham, Fateh al-
Sham, and other factions, and leased back to tenant farmers. 
Some public-sector employees—teachers in particular, but 
also municipal workers and others—regularly cross into 
regime-controlled Hama to collect wages from the Syrian 
state.9
But many Idlibis depended on food, sanitary products, 
temporary housing, and other relief provided by aid 
organizations including the International Rescue Committee 
(IRC), Mercy Corps, People in Need, and GOAL. Much 
of that relief was, in turn, quietly sponsored by the United 
States and other donor governments.10 And it has largely run 
through the province’s local councils.
Idlib’s Local Councils
City- and town-level local councils as well as subsidiary, 
village-level “branch councils” have filled the service and 
governance void left by the Assad regime across Idlib 
province and Syria’s other rebel-held areas.
As with nearly everything in Syria’s war, arrangements for 
local governance vary from one area to the next and from 
town to town, but councils typically amount to a central 
administrative council and a set of specialized executive 
offices focused on areas like relief and municipal services.
There are 144 local councils across Idlib, including thirty city 
councils, according to former Saraqib Local Council head 
and Idlib Provincial Council member Osama al-Hussein.11 
The Saraqib Local Council, he said, is responsible for 
150,000 people in Saraqib and the surrounding area and has 
thirteen subordinate branch councils.
Much of local councils’ importance hinges on their 
relationships with “munazzamat” (organizations), a 
catchall term that includes everything from development 
contractors to international NGOs. Although some donors 
that still recognize the Syrian state in Damascus prefer to 
work with local NGOs and relief associations instead of local 
councils that operate in defiance of Assad regime authority, 
most relief organizations and charities have designated the 
councils their go-to civilian partner at the local level.
Local councils are thus the main vehicle for external support 
to their community. They routinely submit lists of vulnerable 
relief recipients and help coordinate and oversee relief 
distribution, including going house to house with donor 
organizations’ representatives to deliver food baskets and 
other assistance.
“[Local councils] know they need to provide certain things 
for an NGO to come work with them,” said Alaa’, a Syrian 
humanitarian worker with an international relief NGO based 
in Antakya, Turkey, who spoke on the condition that only 
his first name be used. “They need a ‘focal point,’ they need 
stamps, they need credibility with the list [of aid recipients], 
they need to represent everyone.”12
In addition to helping organize relief distribution, councils 
also provide some intermittently successful municipal 
services, ranging from operating bakeries13 to street-cleaning 
and trash disposal,14 repairs to the water grid,15 and road 
maintenance.16
Many of these more resource-intensive services are 
supported by international donors such as the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID) and the United 
Kingdom’s Department for International Development 
(DfID), which have made support for civilian governance 
and service provision a priority. The United States has 
provided support through a number of offices, including 
both USAID proper and USAID’s Office of Transition 
Initiatives (USAID/OTI), whose “Syria Regional Program” 
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has a more directed, political mandate to support moderate 
opposition organizations and promote values of tolerance.17 
Some international assistance has been delivered through 
discrete, branded projects such as “Bil-Akhdar” (In Green) 
and “Tamkeen” (Empowerment), supported by donors 
including USAID,18 the United Kingdom Conflict Pool, and 
the European Union.19
Local councils coexist and cooperate with other nascent 
local institutions, including Syria Civil Defence emergency 
first responders (the “White Helmets”) and the Idlib Free 
Police, that are also supported by international donor 
governments.20
All these councils’ work is typically broadcasted on their 
Facebook pages, complete with thanks to their various 
organizational partners and donors.
Local councils originally had their roots in early, local activist 
collectives (“local coordinating committees”) and relief 
associations. Various donors later pushed to standardize the 
local council model across rebel-held areas and fold those 
councils under the then-nascent Idlib Provincial Council 
and Syrian Interim Government, the exiled opposition’s 
executive body.21
Councils are elected or nominated in local arrangements 
that differ from town to town, from variations on indirect 
elections to consensus among town notables.
In Saraqib, the city’s main constituencies (including large 
families, revolutionary youth, civil society organizations) 
contribute representatives to a 166-member “notables 
council” (majlis a’yan). The notables council elect an advisory 
“shura council” and the head of the main administrative 
council, who staffs executive offices and runs the city.22
In Khan Sheikhoun, local council head Osama al-Sayyadi said 
that the Idlib Provincial Council formed and led a committee 
that reviewed thirty council nominees according to a set of 
common criteria, including educational attainment and their 
track record of work in the community. The committee then 
referred the twelve nominees with qualifying scores to a 
meeting of local organizations, including rebel factions, but 
also various charitable associations, for consensus approval.
Council elections or nominations, in whatever interpolation 
is deemed locally workable, represent a first-of-its-kind 
experience in participatory government for Syrians 
accustomed to life under an authoritarian security state.
“Before the revolution, people would be named [to 
municipal positions] by the security services, or there would 
be show elections in which the votes weren’t counted,” said 
Muhammad al-Mustafa, director of the opposition-leaning 
research organization Toran Center. “We used to hear 
about someone winning before the elections—[we’d say] 
‘Congrats, you won.’”23
Still, these first attempts at self-governance have run up 
against a number of challenges.
A major obstacle to councils’ effectiveness and 
professionalism, both according to council members 
themselves and others who work with them, is that council 
members typically aren’t paid a regular living wage.
Many employees of dedicated municipal service offices, 
such as water maintenance teams, continue to collect wages 
from the Assad regime. This is the case in many areas that 
have slipped out of government control, including areas now 
ruled by the Islamic State.24 But members of the councils 
themselves largely work on a volunteer basis. Some councils 
receive donor stipends or collect “jibayah” (fees for utilities 
or bread), which they can use to defray costs and pay some 
partial wages. But external support for local councils is 
mostly in-kind, such as food baskets or service equipment 
like dumpsters and generators. In practice, that means that 
local council work is often done by wealthy residents who 
can spare the time, or by less well-off, distracted locals 
who moonlight at their day job to provide for their families. 
Many qualified Syrians are drawn to better-paying work 
for international NGOs or development contractors, and 
the well-intentioned dentists and lawyers who can afford 
to volunteer on councils often aren’t the best-equipped to 
handle the actual work of administering a town.
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After years without real taxation, it seems impossible for 
a local council that provides only a few spotty municipal 
services to ask its community to start contributing more. 
“People would burn down the council,” said Saraqib’s Osama 
al-Hussein.25
Without a tax base, the continuity of service projects 
depends on continued external support. Amr Tarrisi, 
Director of Programs with Syrian relief organization Binafsaj, 
said his organization had supported municipal services in 
some areas with dumpsters, equipment, and fuel. But after 
his organization’s support stopped, the projects, initially 
successful, fell into disrepair. “There’s no sustainability, 
because they can’t fund themselves,” he said. “And any 
project might be a target for bombing.”26
Corruption, Nepotism, 
and Armed Group Interference
Local councils’ work has been marred by corruption and, 
more often, nepotism, favoritism, and waste in local council 
staffing and aid distribution.
Irregularities are often more pronounced in rural areas and 
small towns than in Idlib’s cities, where local councils tend 
to be more organized and professional. Many of these city 
councils have simply assimilated the Assad regime’s existing 
municipal service offices, complete with most of their 
staff, who proceed with their work more or less normally. 
But in smaller villages and rural areas, more municipal 
responsibilities are arrogated directly to a council whose 
seats might be divided between a handful of big families or 
clans.
“If the family is rich, or if it’s big, you know how they deal with 
this—‘One family, one pocket,’” said humanitarian worker 
Alaa’. “So if you’re my cousin and you’re rich, then I’m rich.”27
“The mindset is that you have the headman of the family 
who serves as the family authority and reference point, so 
you put him forward as your representative on the LC,” 
said Nour Hallak, who trained local council members for an 
international development contractor. “But then you end 
up with old men who can distribute largesse without real 
qualifications.”28
Local councils must also contend with local rebel factions, 
which may intervene in their work either directly or through 
indirect tools of pressure. Rebels may be formally involved 
in approving key local council appointments, as in Khan 
Sheikhoun and Sarmin, or may impose civilian members 
understood to be linked to a faction. Local commanders can 
also take it upon themselves to investigate and arbitrate in a 
claim of council malfeasance.
“We don’t have policemen, or an army,” Alaa’ said. “So the 
same soldier who’s fighting for four months on the front 
line, he comes back and becomes a policeman. He’s got the 
same mentality.”29
Some factions also maintain Islamic courts that enjoy 
varying degrees of formal independence from their factional 
sponsor, but these courts seem not to meddle normally in 
councils’ work.
In many areas, rebels have seized the property of regime 
supporters and divided public property as “spoils.” That 
can sometimes mean that rebels control the local sources 
of revenue that could help make the area council self-
sustaining.
“For example, the local council doesn’t control the water,” 
said Hallak, “so it can’t collect a utility bill for water, so it can’t 
[afford to] operate the water pump. So the local faction gets 
to keep selling the water in tanker trucks.”
In the ideal case, a popular, well-resourced local council can 
reverse this power dynamic and either dictate to or establish 
a mutually beneficial working relationship with area factions. 
But no local council can operate in a hermetically sealed 
bubble, isolated from the wartime context and the armed 
groups around it.
“Part of what makes a local council successful is that it can 
navigate relationships with armed groups, not that it insulates 
itself from them,” said another Western development worker 
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who also spoke on condition of anonymity. “The challenge 
is to be as independent as possible while meeting as many 
needs as possible.”30
Most interviewees for this report said they thought the 
majority of local councils were hard-working and honest. 
(Ones that weren’t, they said, often saw support for their 
communities cut off by frustrated aid organizations.) Many 
local council members are professionals with means who 
could have made a life abroad. Instead, they’ve remained 
inside Idlib to literally keep the lights on in their home 
communities and deliver needed assistance, all for minimal 
pay.
“I think the people doing this work are a sort of ‘administrative 
combatant,’” said Mustafa, of the Toran Center. “The people 
who do this work in the liberated areas are no less brave than 
those fighting on the front lines.”31
But when irregularities happen, there’s nobody to 
systematically supervise councils and hold them accountable.
“There’s no authority on the ground to check them,” said 
Fouad Sayyed Issa, another relief worker with Binafsaj. “They 
don’t answer to the factions; at the start, they fell under the 
Interim Government, but now they answer to no one.”32
The Idlib Provincial Council
In theory, Idlib’s local councils exist within an official, 
donor-promoted superstructure of opposition institutions. 
These include the Idlib Provincial Council, an opposition 
counterpart to the regime’s provincial authority; the National 
Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, 
the opposition’s deliberative body in exile; and the Syrian 
Interim Government, the opposition’s executive authority.
At one point, these bodies were a Syrian state-in-
waiting, a sort of simulacrum of the regime’s structures. 
They represented an inclusive, civilian-led, revolutionary 
alternative to the regime and its institutions.
Yet as Syria’s war has dragged on and a political transition 
has become increasingly improbable, the political rationale 
for an opposition shadow state has become increasingly 
unclear. The Coalition and the Interim Government have 
seen dysfunction and allegations of corruption tarnish their 
image. Donor support has fallen off.
Still, the Idlib Provincial Council has continued to work to 
serve the province’s residents. It can claim some functional 
relevance as a channel for important donor assistance and, 
amid a vacuum of legitimacy in the province, it can claim 
at least a partial democratic popular mandate. And, at least 
on paper, it should be the supervisory authority Idlib’s local 
councils need.
The Provincial Council was established in 2013, but for 
several years it remained based in Turkey and only semi-
functional. It took on a more active role in 2015, when it 
moved its headquarters to Hazano, Idlib, with another office 
in Gaziantep.
Yet unlike the relatively influential provincial council in 
neighboring Aleppo, the Idlib Provincial Council has 
struggled to assume a really central, authoritative role in a 
province where Islamist and jihadist armed groups—many 
with mixed or negative feelings about civilian opposition 
institutions like the Coalition—hold sway.
“It’s a tough thing to work in Idlib,” said one Western 
development worker.33
Like a super-sized local council, the Provincial Council has 
a set of specialized offices focused on areas like education 
and agriculture, as well as representative offices across the 
province. Yet the real measure of the Provincial Council’s 
impact is not its own programming, but its direct support for 
local councils and for projects implemented in conjunction 
with councils.
Some key support for local council service provision runs 
through the Provincial Council, including larger projects 
from USAID/OTI’s Syria Regional Program aimed at linking 
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and strengthening the province’s civilian institutions.34 A 
service project might come from an OTI implementer as 
part of the Syria Regional Program, said Osama al-Hussein 
of Saraqib, but the local council would sign the contract with 
the Provincial Council.35
The Provincial Council’s influence depends on what it can 
provide, especially to local councils, according to current 
Provincial Council head Ghassan Hammou. “We need to 
meet these local councils’ needs—for basic goods, electricity, 
water, food, transportation,” he said. “We need to provide, so 
we get legitimacy and strength, so the people are with us.”36
But the council has otherwise had to grapple with scant 
resources and limited influence over local councils. In practice, 
the Provincial Council is closer to another “munazzamah” 
(the singular of munazzamat, or organizations) among 
many furnishing support and projects to these councils 
than it is to a supreme body. Many relief organizations opt 
to deal directly with local councils, weakening the Provincial 
Council’s leverage.
The Provincial Council “doesn’t have anything at all,” 
Hammou said, frustrated. “If some organization comes 
along with $500,000 to distribute, for that much I could get 
loyalty for more than a hundred Provincial Councils.”
“We want to provide something tangible on the ground,” he 
said. “We want to go back and say that, with the hands of 
Syria’s sons, we restored a modern, prosperous Syria, a Syria 
of security and peace.”
“The Provincial Council is both the strongest and weakest 
link,” said Saraqib’s Hussein. “Strongest in that it is the only 
party that has legitimacy, inside or outside the country, as 
a representative, elected body. So it’s the strongest, and it 
can affect [foreign] support. But it’s the weakest in that it 
isn’t given resources, something that could pull together the 
province.”37
The council has taken tenuous steps to fix that. In August 
2016, it convened a meeting of Idlib local councils, where it 
announced work on establishing a central oversight body to 
supervise those councils, and a planning body to define their 
relationship with external organizations and donor bodies.38 
If successful, the move could institutionalize the work of 
Idlib’s local councils.
 
The Service Administration 
Commission
But a weak Provincial Council and local councils that are, 
in important ways, structurally deficient have helped invite 
other bodies to set themselves up as a partial alternative—in 
particular, the Service Administration Commission (SAC) 
backed by Islamist faction Ahrar al-Sham.
Ahrar al-Sham official Ammar Labib (“Abu al-Zahra”), an 
engineer by trade, established the SAC in September 2015 
to coordinate service bodies in Syria’s rebel-held north.39 It 
was Labib’s idea to establish an independent, civilian body, 
“out from under the skirts of these military organizations,” 
said SAC external relations official Firas al-Raslan.40 Raslan 
said the SAC’s leadership had recognized the importance 
of dealing with the outside world to build a functioning civil 
administration in Syria’s opposition-held areas.
The SAC’s primary mission is to coordinate and complement 
Idlib’s local councils, although it has provided a broad 
range of its own support and service projects across Idlib 
and adjacent areas of Lattakia and Hama, ranging from 
road repairs41 to the regulation of public property,42 the 
maintenance of civil registries,43 and relief for IDPs.44 The 
SAC has typically formalized its work with “memoranda 
of understanding” with local councils and various relief 
bodies, agreements that in some cases have given the SAC 
oversight of councils’ work and finances.45 The SAC has also 
supervised the formation and restructuring of local councils 
in areas where they’ve been nonexistent or dysfunctional.46 
Among its specialized offices, it has advertised an Oversight 
and Follow-up Administration meant to check corruption 
and misuse of public funds in local councils.47
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SAC officials and Ahrar al-Sham have deliberately kept their 
relationship ambiguous. Labib, for example, has stressed in 
media interviews that the SAC is “civilian and independent.”48 
But Idlibis interviewed for this report all understood the SAC 
to be quietly backed by Ahrar al-Sham, something Raslan 
himself acknowledged.
“A body that belongs to Ahrar?49 Sounds good,” Raslan 
told me. “I don’t have a problem saying that it’s a body that 
belongs to Ahrar if Ahrar protects us.”
“Our work and organization are independent,” he said, “but 
Ahrar protects us because they see that as being in the 
public interest.”50
Both Raslan and his deputy, Qutaiba al-Shiqran, had served 
with Ahrar al-Sham, although they said that so long as they 
were working for the SAC, they were outside Ahrar. They 
said only a handful of top SAC officials, including the two of 
them and Labib, had been with Ahrar al-Sham and that the 
SAC’s other employees were civilian technocrats.51
But the SAC’s case for its efficacy and legitimacy hangs in 
part on its relationship with Ahrar al-Sham. The SAC claims 
resources, technocratic expertise, and a tangible presence 
inside rebel-held Syria, with which it can link and coordinate 
local councils inside Idlib and in neighboring provinces. It 
also says it can credibly play the sort of oversight role these 
councils need, putting a stop to the sort of corruption and 
dysfunction that persists in many towns.
But it can do that in large part because of its ties with Ahrar 
al-Sham, which also give it the weight it needs to keep other, 
more menacing armed factions out of civilian life.
The SAC’s case is a realist one: it can make things work. As 
for armed group influence, it’s just a fact inside the country, 
and civilian actors need to align with a faction to protect 
themselves. “The councils need to build relationships with 
whoever’s closest to them if they’re going to succeed,” 
Raslan said. “That’s a reality.”
But the SAC’s ties to Ahrar al-Sham had complicated its 
outreach to donor organizations, Raslan said, exasperated. 
The SAC had approached some development contractors 
to forge partnerships and even to appeal for direct support, 
he said, but had been rebuffed because of concerns over 
armed group control. The SAC’s military “cover” had proved 
to be a problem, he said, even though he emphasized that 
this cover was a practical necessity inside the country and 
that the SAC enjoyed popular support.
“The same way ‘Abu Lahya’”—a nickname meaning “Father 
of the Beard,” or some guy with a beard—“is considered a 
terrorist in America, the SAC is considered Ahrar,” he said. 
“I don’t know how to convince them we’re a civilian body.”
Still, Raslan said he thought the SAC had been successful so 
far, given its limited means, and he thought the SAC could 
be a service component within Syria’s future, post-revolution 
state. “Anything we can do for people inside, we’ll do,” said 
Raslan. “But within a specific framework that we won’t go 
beyond. We don’t work for anyone.”52
The SAC Builds Relationships
Relief workers in neighboring Turkey said they had sat with 
representatives from the SAC in meetings that had been, on 
the whole, positive.
“In comparison with the Nusra Front’s PSA, Ahrar’s SAC 
is more intelligent and more flexible,” said a Syrian relief 
worker who spoke on condition of anonymity. “They’re not 
stubborn. They come here, and we’ve had more than one 
meeting with them. And their cooperation with the Turkish 
side here is good.”
“Their officials are engineers, doctors, educated people,” he 
said. “Whereas the Nusra Front’s people are a little stubborn, 
it can be difficult to deal with them.” He added, however, 
that his organization only works with local councils and had 
no memorandum of understanding with the SAC.53
Some officials involved with governance inside Idlib were 
more critical of the SAC. They agreed that Idlib’s local 
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councils needed some sort of supervising authority, but they 
said the SAC didn’t serve that function.
Saraqib’s Osama al-Hussein said that the SAC had 
deliberately brought on locally influential people from 
across the province who could turn around and convince 
their respective local councils to sign memoranda of 
understanding with the SAC. To appeal to local councils, he 
said, “They’d offer a little project, and a wage to the head of 
the local council—like a bribe.”54
Other local council officials said the SAC had made some 
headway in winning over local councils, but that its reach was 
more limited than it claimed. It had mostly established itself 
in areas with poorly resourced local councils or councils that 
had been denied outside support, they said.
“There are areas that are weak, with weak local councils, and 
minimal services that have been forced to join the SAC 
so they can cover these sectors and provide services to 
citizens,” said Ibrahim Nabhan, deputy head of the Sarmin 
Local Council and head of its media office.
Nabhan said his council had signed a memorandum of 
understanding with the SAC but that it was voided after the 
Sarmin council bristled under the SAC’s oversight. “They 
wanted everything inside Sarmin to go back to them—what 
comes to us, they would take it, then it would be distributed 
through them,” he said. The SAC’s promised services weren’t 
enough to keep the Sarmin local council on board, Nabhan 
said. “They would provide services like they do to any area 
under the SAC, which isn’t enough,” he told me. He also 
said there were problems between the SAC and Sarmin’s 
shura council, which includes a member from Ahrar al-Sham 
but also representatives of a number of other jihadist and 
Islamist rebel factions.55
Part of why the SAC has run into resistance from some 
foreign donors may be concerns that the SAC is edging out 
the Idlib Provincial Council. Raslan said the SAC coordinates 
and has a strong relationship with the Idlib Provincial 
Council.56 But speaking about the SAC, Provincial Council 
head Ghassan Hammou was clearly unnerved by the body’s 
appeals to some local councils.
“They come and say, ‘We’re with you,’ or they offer some 
wages,” he said. The SAC and other military or military-
linked actors, he said, were “frustrating the people’s will.”
The previous leadership of Provincial Council had signed 
a memorandum of understanding with the SAC, Hammou 
said, but only for a single project to provide flour. He said he 
now considered that memorandum expired.
“If we’re weakened, that’s a problem,” he said, “It’ll take years 
to recover the people’s right to decide for itself.”57
The Public Service Administration
The Fateh al-Sham Front’s PSA58 seems, like Fateh al-Sham 
itself, less interested in managing its image outside the 
country and juggling a complex, political set of relationships. 
The PSA is Fateh al-Sham’s service administration, which is 
more or less how it presents itself.
“[The SAC] shows Ahrar’s sophistication in terms of its 
longer vision and sense of the bigger picture, with things 
like its mergers-and-acquisitions strategy,” a Western 
development worker told me. “It’s just better at navigating 
these relationships and being the glue that holds things 
together.” The PSA, he said, “is much less nuanced.”
The PSA and its approach seem to be a sort of translation 
of Fateh al-Sham’s operating philosophy as an armed 
faction into the service sector. Like Fateh al-Sham itself, it 
is dislocated from dynamics outside the country and cut 
off from foreign backing. Yet, even as it has lined up local 
revenues to ensure its own sustainability, it lacks the sort of 
resource base that would allow it take sole control of the 
service sector in its areas of operation. Instead, it has mostly 
focused on a few extremely visible, high-impact services and 
sectors that demonstrate its value and indispensability to the 
local public, not unlike how Fateh al-Sham’s car bombs and 
shock troops have served as the tip of the spear for rebel 
offensives.
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Also like Fateh al-Sham, the PSA exists parallel to but clearly 
apart from the opposition mainstream, in this case the local 
councils. The result is a sharp contrast to the bridging and 
coordinating role Ahrar al-Sham has played between Syria’s 
nationalist and jihadist armed factions, as well as the SAC’s 
own efforts to link revolutionary bodies.
The PSA was originally established in and around Aleppo city, 
where it focused mainly on maintaining and operating key 
infrastructure, including the Suleiman al-Halabi water station 
and sections of the electrical grid.59 The body expanded into 
Idlib in summer 2015. Ahmed al-Shami, an engineer and 
head of the PSA’s media office, said the PSA entered after 
the capture of Idlib city “to fill the administrative vacuum that 
followed after the liberation of these huge areas, to preserve 
public facilities, and to provide public services to residents.”60
Like the PSA in Aleppo, the Idlib PSA maintains key 
electrical infrastructure, including the main electrical line that 
runs north from Hama to Aleppo61 and secondary electrical 
connections across Idlib province.62 (On its Facebook page, 
it posts regular updates about the status of the electrical 
grid in northern Syria.63) The body also provides additional 
municipal services in Fateh al-Sham strongholds, including 
Idlib’s western countryside; sections of the southern Idlib 
countryside (which the PSA calls, confusingly, its “Hama 
Branch);64 and the Badiyyah desert.65
The PSA at the Local Level
Instead of complementing and reinforcing existing local 
councils, as the SAC does, Fateh al-Sham’s PSA seems 
instead to have taken more overt control of service provision 
and to have filled service gaps itself through PSA offices.
The actual shape of the PSA and its executive offices seem 
to vary by area. In southern Idlib, the PSA advertises the work 
of its Electricity Directorate,66 a Water Directorate,67 and 
a Service Office68 responsible for miscellaneous municipal 
repairs. The PSA’s Hama Branch has highlighted services 
including electricity and water provision, bakeries, and road 
repair.69 In western Idlib, it’s not clear what bodies the PSA 
now maintains. Unlike local councils elsewhere, service 
institutions in this area seem not to advertise their work to 
their constituents and foreign donors on Facebook, perhaps 
due to Fateh al-Sham’s concerns about photography and 
operational security.
In December 2015, Fateh al-Sham (then the Nusra Front) 
advertised the work of a “municipality” in the west Idlib town 
of Darkoush that was handling sanitation, bakeries, relief 
provision, and repairs to sewage lines.70 Interviewees said 
the Nusra Front had moved in 2015 to change at least some 
local councils in the western countryside to “municipalities,” 
but Nusra later retreated after its municipalities ran up 
against objections from relief organizations that insisted on 
working with local councils. Now these areas have both local 
councils that handle relief and communication with outside 
organizations, and PSA municipalities that handle service 
matters like phone lines, water, and sanitation.71
Some of these western Idlib towns, such as Salqin, had long-
standing local councils. In September 2016, Fateh al-Sham 
tweeted photos of the “PSA”—no clarification on precisely 
what subsidiary body—paving roads in Salqin.72 “With 
respect to these names, this is just normal,” the PSA’s Shami 
said. “Every city, town, and village has its own way of life, so 
this has to do with the residents of these areas.”73
Khan Sheikhoun Local Council head Osama al-Sayyadi said 
Fateh al-Sham’s PSA bears much of the service burden in 
his city, including the operation of bakeries and water and 
electricity provision.74 “Every [service] institution needs 
support,” he told me. “It needs generators, maintenance, 
operating costs. The council doesn’t have these things. 
Whereas the PSA, in principle, has the resources—even if 
they’re not much—to provide these services.”
Sayyadi said his council, which he described as chronically 
under-resourced, had recently agreed with the PSA to take 
over sanitation services in the city.75 He said he hoped the 
council could take over water provision next; he had already 
approached donors to apply for the necessary equipment. 
“The local council, in general, is the designated, formal body 
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for organizations to work with,” Sayyadi said, “whereas only a 
few organizations will deal with the PSA.”
“The PSA is providing services within its means, but it can’t 
handle all these portfolios in the city,” he said.
Sayyadi estimated that 90 percent of the PSA’s employees 
in Khan Sheikhoun were locals. “Given that they’ve been 
hired from the city of Khan Sheikhoun,” he said, “we deal 
with them in terms of serving the city.”76
Interviewees said the PSA was mostly civilian, but that its 
managers were Fateh al-Sham members.77 The PSA denied 
this, saying all the PSA’s employees were civilian. “The PSA 
is a wholly civilian service body,” the PSA’s Shami said. “It 
doesn’t have any military or political activity.” Critically, 
the PSA pays its employees a regular wage, albeit not a 
particularly large one.
The PSA Works (Mostly) Alone
The PSA’s Shami acknowledged that many relief and 
development organizations would not work with the PSA. 
“Every organization has its own policy,” Shami wrote. “Some 
refuse to deal with us, while others deal and coordinate with 
us in some way.” He declined to name the organizations that 
coordinate with the PSA, so as not to “embarrass” them.
But he said a lack of cooperation from foreign organizations 
wasn’t a major obstacle; there are alternative sources of 
support, and the PSA relies on resources inside the country, 
including revenue-generating projects. He declined to 
specify the PSA’s sources of revenue “for fear they might be 
targeted and dried up.”
Fateh al-Sham and, by association, the PSA have also 
had real and reasonable concerns about security and the 
role of outside organizations, which may collect data on 
local demographics and atmospherics to further their 
programming. “[Fateh al-Sham], or any other faction, has to 
intervene in the local councils’ work and impose some things, 
particularly related to security,” said Binafsaj’s Fouad Sayyed 
Issa. “So with [outside] organizations in particular, sometimes 
they might forbid dealing with a particular organization.”78 
Binafsaj works in a number of areas controlled by armed 
factions, including Fateh al-Sham.79
By late 2016, the PSA seemed to have stopped growing. 
PSA spokesman Shami said the PSA was ready to expand 
to any newly liberated area,80 and some interviewees said it 
had previously approached local councils to establish ties or 
tried to establish service outposts in areas of mixed factional 
control.81 But at least its normal municipal service provision 
seemed confined to clear zones of Nusra dominance.
In these areas, it likely makes sense to treat PSA as part 
of a larger apparatus of Fateh al-Sham control, a suite of 
institutions that also include “Dar al-Qada” courts and 
the Islamic Police. Although these bodies have operated 
separately from the PSA, the cumulative effect has been 
that Fateh al-Sham had imposed order in its areas of control, 
including accountability for workers in the municipal service 
sector.
“The country needs something like [Fateh al-Sham’s 
authority],” said one relief worker. “There are arms 
everywhere. There needs to be someone whose word is 
carried out by everyone.”82
The PSA’s Shami was, for his part, relatively humble about 
the PSA’s performance, calling it “not bad.” The PSA had 
managed to ensure some service continuity in these areas, 
he told me, despite what he called the Assad regime’s 
systematic destruction of local infrastructure. “In general, 
there have been some failings,” he wrote. “But in light of 
these conditions and the means available, it’s possible to 
justify them.”
The strategic objective behind the PSA is somewhat vague. 
The SAC has the relatively clear aim of becoming the 
connective tissue of local governance in the north, even as it 
has fallen somewhat short of this goal because of its limited 
resources and donor resistance. But beyond capturing 
some raw popular support and, more altruistically, serving 
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Fateh al-Sham members’ communities, it’s not obvious 
what justifies Fateh al-Sham’s investment in the PSA. Its 
expansion into Idlib may have been basically defensive, 
meant to counterbalance Ahrar al-Sham’s newly established 
SAC and to give Fateh al-Sham some rural leverage in a 
contest for influence within the Army of Conquest’s Idlib 
Administration.
The Idlib Administration
The origins of Idlib’s armed group-linked service institutions 
all seem to trace back, one way or another, to the Army of 
Conquest’s string of victories in spring 2015. The capture of 
nearly the entire province raised the ceiling for the political 
ambitions of the entire Syrian opposition, civilian and military.
The opposition’s Interim Government, for one, hailed the 
Army of Conquest’s “great victory,” promising it would 
instruct its directorates to go to work inside Idlib city and 
the Idlib Provincial Council to relocate its headquarters from 
the Idlibi village of Hazano to the provincial seat.83 That 
Interim Government statement met with a sharp denial from 
jihadist evangelist and Army of Conquest judge Abdullah 
al-Muheisini, who tweeted that the opposition National 
Coalition would have no place inside Idlib. The province 
would only be governed by “God’s law,” Muheisini wrote.84
The capture of Idlib city was seen by many in the opposition 
as a second chance to govern responsibly after their failure 
in Raqqa city.
Ahrar al-Sham, the Nusra Front, and several FSA units took 
the northern city of Raqqa in March 2013, making it the first 
provincial capital to fall to the Syrian insurgency. But then, 
in April 2013, most local Nusra Front fighters flipped to the 
newly announced Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), 
and ISIS subsequently expelled the FSA from the city. The 
city was divided between ISIS and Ahrar al-Sham. Ahrar al-
Sham tried to fill the service vacuum in the city and present 
a model for mature Islamist government but, by its own 
leaders’ admission, mostly failed.85 In January 2014, ISIS 
seized sole control of the city, which has since served as its 
de facto Syrian capital and, for the Syrian opposition, a bitter 
reminder of what they lost.
“When Raqqa was liberated, it was fertile ground to build 
the institutions of a state, or an alternative government,” said 
an Idlib activist who asked to use the pseudonym “Sirajjedin 
Ahmed” for fear of retribution by armed groups. “But Raqqa 
didn’t stay in the revolutionaries’ hands for long, and the 
revolutionaries didn’t realize what it meant to set up the 
institutions of a state, or to preserve the state institutions 
and facilities that were already there—hospitals, civil defense 
centers, medical centers.”
“They weren’t able to liberate another provincial capital until 
Idlib city,” he said. Idlib is near to the border with Turkey, a 
friendly country through which rebels could bring supplies 
and relief and humanitarian organizations could come and 
go. With Idlib, he said, “you could accomplish something on 
the ground.”86
The capture of Idlib city was also followed by confusion and 
looting, witnesses told me,87 and then months of debate 
over how the city would be run. But eventually, the Army 
of Conquest’s member factions agreed to establish the Idlib 
Administration under their Shura Council, the province’s 
first real experiment in joint governance by Idlib’s Islamist 
factions.
While PSA spokesman Ahmed al-Shami said the PSA 
entered Idlib to manage the large sections of Idlib province 
taken by the Army of Conquest, both the PSA and the 
SAC have, in fact, mostly stayed out of the sections of Idlib 
seized by the Army of Conquest. Instead, it is the Army of 
Conquest’s joint Idlib Administration that has run Idlib city, 
Ariha, and Muhambal since summer 2015.
The Idlib Administration is “like a local council, but bigger,” 
said its external relations representative Muhammad Jaffa. 
It comprises a set of directorates responsible for areas like 
education, telecommunications, health, and municipal 
services that all answer to a central administration. It also 
operates the faculties of Idlib University, which Jaffa said had 
enrolled 4,500 students at nominal tuition.
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Jaffa had been head of the local council in the town of 
Armanaz, as well as a coordinator for the Qatari Red Cross. 
He chose to work for the Idlib Administration because it was 
the center of the province, he said, and he thought its work 
could have a positive impact across Idlib.88
The Idlib Administration is “a more advanced experiment 
than al-Raqqa,” said Uqba al-Sayyid Ali, a humanitarian 
worker with Binafsaj. Binafsaj has provided relief and other 
assistance in Idlib city.89
The Idlib Administration answers to the Army of Conquest’s 
Idlib Shura Council, made of representatives from the Army 
of Conquest’s various factions. Order in these areas is 
maintained by the Executive Force, a police unit manned by 
rebels from various factions.
The Administration itself is mostly civilian and technocratic, 
but leadership of the Administration, the Shura Council, and 
the Executive Force rotates between the Army of Conquest’s 
factions. Of the four heads of the Administration to date, 
three have come from Ahrar al-Sham and one from Fateh 
al-Sham.90 The first head of the Administration, Mudhar 
Abdussalam Hamdoun (“Abu Abdussalam al-Shami”), was 
fatally wounded fighting with Ahrar al-Sham against the 
Assad regime in south Aleppo.91
Jaffa stressed that the Army of Conquest’s military factions 
don’t intervene in civilian affairs and that the Shura Council 
is primarily concerned with inter-factional disputes. Civilian 
city residents have also formed a notables’ council that can 
receive complaints and appeal for change.92
The relationship between the Army of Conquest’s factions 
themselves has occasionally been tricky. Some say that, as 
in the rest of the province, Ahrar al-Sham and the Fateh 
al-Sham Front have also vied for influence inside Idlib city, 
including within nominally joint institutions.
One Idlib activist who requested anonymity for his safety 
said members of the Executive Force from the Nusra Front 
and Jund al-Aqsa (which subsequently withdrew from the 
Army of Conquest93 and the Idlib Administration94) had 
done an end-run around the Ahrar al-Sham head of the 
Executive Force to seek approval to break up revolutionary 
protests in the city in March 2016.95
“The Nusra Front and Jund members of the Executive 
Force didn’t listen to the Executive Force head, they listened 
to [Shura Council head and Nusra Front commander] Abu 
Abdurrahman al-Zirbeh,” he said. “He brought other Nusra 
Front members with him who attacked the protest and 
abducted six activists.”96
Jaffa said the problems had been caused by activists from 
outside the city, but that the issue had been resolved. The 
Executive Force members who had overstepped their 
bounds were removed, he said.97
The Idlib Administration and the Army of Conquest 
eventually softened on cooperation with the National 
Coalition and other opposition bodies, although 
interviewees said the Interim Government’s role is still 
minimal inside Idlib city and elsewhere in the province.98 The 
Idlib Administration’s Education Directorate, administered 
jointly with the Coalition, has unified the education 
sector across Idlib, including setting examination times 
and dates. Idlib’s health sector is also now run out of Idlib 
city. Jaffa said the Administration was working to unify 
Idlib’s telecommunications and that it had achieved some 
cooperation on agriculture.99
The hope, he said, was that the Idlib Administration could 
administer the entirety of Idlib province and eventually 
be the nucleus of a mini-government. But he also said the 
Administration was struggling with resistance from donors. 
“In Idlib, they look at the military element that’s in control, 
and use that as a pretense [not to provide support],” he said. 
“Even though no military faction ever interferes in the work 
of the civil administration in Idlib.”
He said some foreign backers had been intimidated by the 
Army of Conquest’s success and by its unified political-
military front.100
Some outside organizations seem to have been deterred by 
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issues of armed group control and by mandatory licensing 
with the Idlib Administration’s Organizations Office. 
This has not been the case for all, however: foreign relief 
organizations like Polish Humanitarian Action (PAH)101 and 
German relief organization arche noVa have both donated 
equipment to the Administration.102
Jaffa said that a lack of resources was a persistent problem 
facing the Idlib Administration and that it had so far been 
unable to return to the level of service provision in the city 
under the Assad regime. “We don’t have countries that 
support us, and we don’t have some national product to take 
care of these costs,” he said.
The Administration collects some limited fees, Jaffa said, 
but not much, and it receives no support from the Army 
of Conquest’s military factions. Many employees work on a 
volunteer basis, he said. The Administration had appealed 
to donors to sponsor wages, but had been turned down.103
Interviewees were sharply divided on the Idlib Administration’s 
performance. Some said it had been a success, albeit one 
sabotaged in part by regime bombing, while others said it 
had been paralyzed by factional dysfunction. Significantly, 
the city’s notables’ council has itself sharply criticized 
the Administration’s poor performance. In a September 
statement, it alleged, among other complaints, that Idlib 
“lacks a real, civilian administration that’s independent of this 
factional tug of war and enjoys sufficient authority.”104
Some have argued for the establishment of civilian local 
councils that could work with foreign organizations and 
receive more expansive international support.
“The Army of Conquest’s Administration has failed 
everywhere,” said Ariha’s Nour Hallak. He and others have 
been lobbying to reinstate a local council in Ariha. Ariha 
is now administered by a local counterpart to the Idlib 
Administration whose service bodies operate, as in Idlib, 
under a supreme council of Army of Conquest rebels.
The Idlib Administration had been able to skate by thanks 
to limited outside support, he said, but it didn’t have the 
resources or capacity to handle its service burden over the 
medium and long term, in Ariha and elsewhere.
“We told them [Ariha] needs a local council, because [relief] 
organizations will bring you food baskets, but big companies 
won’t enter a city that’s under military authority,” Hallak told 
me. A civilian Ariha local council could benefit from projects 
from USAID and DfID contractors, he said.
“We’ve offered to use a different name; a ‘revolutionary 
council,’ for example,” he said. “They think the name ‘local 
council’ means that it belongs to the National Coalition.”105
Idlibis against Each Other
Even as the Syrian opposition in Idlib remains united in its 
resistance to the Assad regime, Idlib’s service sector has 
opened up secondary and tertiary cleavages among Idlib’s 
residents, splits over issues ranging from the province’s civic 
character to super-local familial disputes. Yet the imperative 
of keeping the province functioning has also brought its 
service bodies and residents together in counterintuitive 
ways.
Saraqib’s Osama al-Hussein described a race for influence 
between the Idlib Provincial Council, the PSA, and the SAC. 
“The struggle is between those three axes,” Hussein said, 
“and each one is trying to win the local councils for itself.”
In one extreme example, PSA-SAC competition helped 
lead to actual bloodshed between Ahrar al-Sham and Fateh 
al-Sham in the west Idlib city of Salqin. As outlined in a 
subsequent judicial ruling106 and according to knowledgeable 
interviewees, the PSA was already operating in the city, but, 
in coordination with the local council, the SAC established 
a service office. A scuffle between the locals responsible for 
each service office escalated into a deadly shootout and a 
larger mobilization of Ahrar al-Sham and Fateh al-Sham’s 
fighters before calmer heads ultimately prevailed.107
The deadly clash was, on some level, between Ahrar al-Sham 
and Fateh al-Sham, and between the SAC and PSA. But 
interviewees also emphasized the specific, local dimension 
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of the Salqin episode. As with so much of the big-picture, 
faction-on-faction tension in the province, they ascribed the 
Salqin episode to an essentially local contest for influence 
between two Salqin families who happened to fly different 
factional flags.
“You’re from a family, and I’m from a family,” said the Idlib 
Administration’s Muhammad Jaffa. “So we bring our 
disputes into our work. You want to help with electricity, and 
so do I. You want to win over people, and so do I. So that 
leads to a clash.”108
“When a city is liberated, who takes control of it? Its sons,” 
activist Sirajeddin Ahmed said. “The kids who were driven 
out, and who belong to various factions, they go back to 
their town and control it. So each one of them wants to 
control the city, to be the power in the city. And the smartest 
one runs things.”
“But the meaning of control can differ from the military 
sense,” he went on. “You can do it by providing services, 
building a strong base of popular support… And weapons 
are everywhere, and there are no controls.”109
PSA spokesman Ahmed al-Shami said the province-wide 
competition between various service authorities had both 
an up- and a downside for Idlib’s residents.
“It has a positive side, in that there’s competition to provide 
better services for the civilian public,” he said. “And it has a 
negative one, because of this division and unilateralism you 
see sometimes.” He said he thought these service bodies had 
managed to mitigate this negative aspect by coordinating 
with each other.110
And it is true that, even as these service bodies attempt to 
edge each other out and occasionally inflame local divisions, 
they sometimes collaborate and intersect in unpredictable 
ways.
Khan Sheikhoun and the surrounding area, for example, 
are also served by the SAC in addition to the PSA and the 
local council, although the PSA is the most active locally. 
The SAC has a representative office in Idlib city and Ariha, 
although the Army of Conquest’s Idlib Administration 
serves both cities. And in one update on a disruption to 
the northern electricity grid, the PSA described repairs 
coordinated between the PSA, the Idlib Administration, the 
Idlib Electricity Directorate, and maintenance teams from 
the Assad regime sent north from Hama.111
Idlib judge Ziad al-Basha, who helped supervise Provincial 
Elections in 2016, said he’d expected resistance to holding 
elections in Jisr al-Shughour from the Fateh al-Sham Front 
and the Turkistan Islamic Party, jihadist factions which jointly 
control most of the city. “I was ready to try to build confidence 
with them based on the principle of shura on a consensual 
model,” Basha said. “But I was surprised when they insisted 
that [local delegates to choose the Provincial Council] be 
chosen based on an election.”112 The SAC also advertised its 
role in helping organize Provincial Council elections in Jisr 
al-Shughour,113 as well as in cities like Harem114 and Ariha.115
Where political or ideological imperatives have conflicted 
with practical needs, these bodies have often erred on the 
side of the functional. A relief worker recounted how Fateh 
al-Sham’s PSA had hired a former regime supporter to 
run its office in one west Idlib town. “With the head of the 
municipality, now a PSA member, residents rebelled against 
him and said he was a ‘shabih,’” the relief worker said, using 
a derogatory term for a pro-regime thug. “But [the PSA] 
had advertised the job, and no one applied but him. And his 
qualifications were good, so they hired him.”116
Jaffa, of the Idlib Administration, said that in the immediate 
aftermath of the capture of Idlib city, rebels were sensitive to 
bringing on former municipal employees seen as sympathetic 
to the regime. With time, though, they recognized the need 
to benefit from these civilians’ expertise. “If they hadn’t taken 
up arms, it’s normal,” he said, “If they were with the regime 
rhetorically, no problem.”117
Binafsaj’s Amr Tarrisi put it succinctly: “You can’t have a 
university run by someone who’s illiterate.”118
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At the Mercy of Outside Forces
Yet even as Idlib’s service bodies and residents compete with 
each other, they must also grapple with forces beyond their 
control.
The regime’s aerial bombing seems to be the main obstacle 
to predictable, sustainable civic life in Idlib. “Any discussion 
always needs to focus on the bombing,” said Binafsaj relief 
worker Fouad Sayyed Issa.119
Idlib judge Ziad al-Basha described going through the 
work to procure, install, and operate mechanized bakeries 
in Idlib towns—only to have the regime’s air force to bomb 
the bakeries into fragments, and then have to start all over. 
“Every time we try to improve civil society,” Basha said, “we 
run into aerial bombing that destroys these institutions’ 
infrastructure and empties the area of its residents.”120
These service bodies must also contend with the galaxy of 
local and international organizations on which they and their 
constituents depend for support.
Without some supervising or organizing authority for 
the province’s local councils, oversight of service and 
relief projects is mostly left to the sponsoring NGOs and 
contractors. Continuing support for these councils and the 
communities for which they are responsible is essentially at 
the mercy of these organizations, which can, per their own 
assessments, build up a council or abruptly cut it off.
“The local council is integrally linked to this [external] 
support,” Ariha’s Hallak said. “If it ends, the local council 
ends.”121
Donors “are creating these little cantons, where they don’t 
accept anyone else being involved or any interference,” said 
Provincial Council head Ghassan Hammou.122
In some instances, interviewees involved in governance 
complained, development programming had deliberately 
targeted specific towns and not others. Instead of highlighting 
model governance and spurring the other councils to reform, 
they said, it had only turned resentful councils against each 
other.123
And the specific focus on local councils and many 
organizations’ refusal to work with other bodies have likely 
incentivized armed groups to try to coopt and infiltrate 
them. The SAC’s Firas al-Raslan made this point himself 
when criticizing donors’ unwillingness to work directly with 
the SAC.124
Yet those same organizations also find themselves in a 
profoundly insecure position inside the country, particularly 
as they try to work around armed factions. Aid shipments 
into Idlib regularly require three or more approvals, including 
from the Bab al-Hawa border crossing, the court in Sarmada 
backed by Fateh al-Sham, and the Ahrar al-Sham-backed 
court in Binnish.
“Issues in north Idlib could ruin everything,” humanitarian 
worker Alaa’ said. “Because the same people manage 
everything—civil life, the army, and the police.”125
When NGOs encounter dysfunctional local partners, 
interviewees said, they had limited options if they want 
to continue to work in that area. In theory, they could do 
anything from giving councils polite recommendations to 
coordinating the formation of a new local council with civilian 
actors in the town.126 But according to Alaa’, “the last thing 
we want to do is intervene to form a local council,” which 
he said would be “nearly impossible” for an NGO. “We’re 
already facing challenges related to our assistance itself, our 
funding: ‘Why are you here?’ ‘You’re thieves,’ ‘you’re spies.’”127
At least some foreign organizations are also sensitive to the 
legal and ethical complications of providing material support 
or reputational benefit to armed factions, particularly those 
that the United States and United Nations have designated 
terrorist groups.
For Syrian civilians on the ground, the effect can be 
frustrating. “Suppose I’m from so-and-so Organization,” said 
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Muhammad Jaffa of the Idlib Administration. “If I provided 
support for the service sector in, say, Harem, and Harem is 
an area that Nusra controls militarily, then that means Nusra 
might succeed. No! You’re providing for the regular citizen. 
He’s the one who benefits. I don’t know how they’re figuring 
it, it’s backwards.”128
Khan Sheikhoun Local Council head Osama al-Sayyadi said 
he had appealed for support for his city, but that the city and 
its council had become locked in a sort of vicious cycle—he 
couldn’t get support because Fateh al-Sham (or the Nusra 
Front) was providing services, and he couldn’t take over 
service provision because no one would provide him with 
support.
“Recently, some organizations have avoided working in our 
area because of the presence of the Nusra Front,” he told 
me. “More than once, we sent them messages saying the 
local council has a service role in the city and isn’t related to 
the Nusra Front, and the Nusra Front doesn’t interfere in the 
work of the local council. More than once, we delivered this 
message, but they’d get the opposite message. They’d hear 
that the LC doesn’t have any role.
“I told you before that the local council doesn’t have any 
resources, that it hasn’t received any operating costs to 
work,” he said. “So who’s provided most services in the area? 
The Nusra Front.”129
A Microcosm of the War
Idlib’s governance and service sector has been, in many ways, 
a microcosm of the Syrian war and Idlib’s fractious rebel 
scene. As with the province’s armed opposition, an existing 
tendency towards localism and disparate, uncoordinated 
streams of external support have resulted in a service sector 
that is discombobulated and fractious.
Foreign donors have propped up a nationalist, democratic 
model—but instead of FSA armed factions, they have backed 
local councils and a provincial council that, at least in theory, 
answer to internationally recognized opposition institutions 
like the Coalition. And like the FSA, these donor-approved 
service bodies have coexisted with less palatable actors that 
collaborate with and occasionally try to displace them.
The entrance of Ahrar al-Sham and the Fateh al-Sham 
Front into the service sector has mirrored their domination 
of Idlib’s military scene. Fateh al-Sham’s PSA, like Fateh 
al-Sham itself, is a blunt instrument, considered toxic by 
international backers. Meanwhile, the Ahrar al-Sham-linked 
SAC and its coordinating mission are another illustration 
of Ahrar al-Sham’s relative sophistication. Yet even as the 
SAC, like Ahrar al-Sham, has been willing to engage with 
outsiders, those outside parties have remained unwilling to 
provide it with normal support—it has gotten meetings, but 
not money. Both the PSA and SAC have complemented the 
foreign-backed local councils, as Fateh al-Sham and Ahrar 
al-Sham have done with the FSA. For its part, the Army of 
Conquest’s Idlib Administration has shown similarities to 
rebels’ improvised factional coalitions, and it seems to have 
been subject to many of the same centrifugal forces.
The end result, as with conditions in Syria’s rebel-held areas 
more generally, has been a service sector that doesn’t really 
fit together. “To the extent I’m willing to see some signal 
in the noise, I think Ahrar probably has it,” said a Western 
development worker. “In most other cases, we’re probably 
looking at static.”130
Governance and service provision in Idlib are another 
reminder that, as with the opposition’s armed factions, in 
Syria results have been the currency of legitimacy. Fateh 
al-Sham (formerly the Nusra Front), apparently earned the 
support of opposition Syrians not because of those Syrians’ 
ideological predisposition to al-Qaeda’s worldview and 
mission, but because they saw Nusra fighting and sacrificing 
for them. In the service space, results likewise have mattered. 
That local councils are, to varying extents, representative 
and accountable appears to have earned them goodwill. But 
democratic experiments aside, Idlib’s people have also had 
to worry about basic questions of service functionality just 
to stay alive.
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“The way they have to live, their lifestyle—they’re 
preoccupied with things you take for granted, that you don’t 
even think of,” said humanitarian worker Alaa’. “You don’t 
think of how you’ll get to a place, you have multiple choices 
for transportation. You don’t think about when your phone 
is out of charge, how you’ll charge it. When you want to do 
laundry, you do laundry.”131
Gaps and failures in service provision have been an opening 
for armed groups to meet civilian needs and earn popular 
support; to advance their specific alternative to regime 
order; and even, as the SAC’s Firas al-Raslan suggested, to 
position themselves for a role in a possible postwar system.
It’s not clear that any of this will be successful, of course. 
Projects like the SAC point to the complexity of these 
armed groups, as well as to their evident ambitions beyond 
simple warfighting, even as armed conflict is ongoing. Yet 
their efforts have been stunted by larger dynamics, including 
the prevailing mechanism for international assistance and 
the disruptive effect of Syrian regime airpower.
And it isn’t obvious that whatever goodwill services earn 
these armed groups will merit the investment in terms of 
resources and time, or that Syrian civilians will even attribute 
these service bodies’ work to their factional sponsors. Even 
many of the Syrians interviewed for this report, including 
interviewees involved in relief and service provision 
themselves, confused the similarly named PSA and SAC. 
Binafsaj’s Amr Tarrisi said the mix of service-centric names 
reminded him of the interchangeable, miniature leftist 
parties that, along with the Ba’ath Party, made up the 
Patriotic Progressive Front under the Assad regime. “It’s like 
the Democratic Communist Party, the Democratic whatever 
Party,” he joked.132
Still, these service efforts are evidence of the continuing 
evolution of non-state armed actors. Ahrar al-Sham and 
Fateh al-Sham in particular belong to a broader continuum 
of Islamist militant groups that have attempted governance, 
one that includes Afghanistan’s Taliban and Yemen’s al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Whatever the outcome of 
Syria’s war, it seems likely that these factions’ experiments 
in governance and services will inform other Islamist armed 
groups around the world.
Idlib’s service scene and how armed groups have acted in and 
around it also highlights how, in a civil conflict such as Syria’s, 
outside aid and more politicized support for governance are 
not dictated from without. This sort of assistance is a sort of 
dialogue with local actors, including armed groups that are 
ready to work around prevailing aid dynamics and even, in 
some instances, lobby donors directly for support.
And, when taken in the broader context of the Syrian war, 
Idlib’s experience raises larger questions about the logic of 
a humanitarian or development intervention in a military 
conflict that donor states are unwilling or unable to end.
Provincial Council head Ghassan Hammou highlighted 
the apparent absurdity of Western civilian intervention in 
Syria when recounting a capacity-building exercise with 
a development contractor. “We got training on financial 
systems,” he said, “but what’s the point when there are planes 
overhead?”133
The scope of the violence and disorder of Syria’s war 
has seemed magnitudes bigger than anyone’s means, 
individually or collectively. None of Idlib’s service and 
relief bodies, whether Syrian or foreign, civilian or military, 
working together or at cross-purposes, have been capable 
of rationalizing life inside the province. And none of the 
province’s competing service institutions have been in a 
position to somehow take control of the entirety of Idlib.
Any project to build and re-build semi-normal, functioning 
governance amid Syria’s war—and, most importantly, 
as Assad regime and Russian aircraft continue to 
indiscriminately bomb opposition-held cities and towns—
has been, on some level, Sisyphean. Nearly every attempt 
at civic organization has been partially frustrated by aerial 
bombing and violence. The people best-equipped to help, 
Syrian professionals educated before the war, continue to 
leave the country. And none of these civilian institutions and 
exercises in participatory self-government have built toward 
a broader political transition that, nearly everyone now 
acknowledges, will not happen.
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“I’ll be honest with you,” said humanitarian worker Alaa’, 
“When I started doing this job, I always wondered, why is the 
U.S. paying this money? Why is the UK paying this money? 
Why don’t they just stop the war instead of fueling the war 
and…” He left the thought unfinished.134
Despite this, the Syrians interviewed for this report all seemed 
genuinely concerned for the well-being of their towns and 
families. Even when some of them fudged issues of armed 
group control, or angled for donor funding, or talked down 
rivals, they all seemed moved by their loved ones inside Idlib.
And even when Idlib’s various civilian- and militia-linked 
service bodies have competed with each other to repair the 
water pipes or replace road signs, they have been, at base, 
competing to make Syrians’ lives marginally better.
These bodies’ attempts to serve Syrians have been, on 
some level, about a competition for influence and legitimacy 
between nascent civilian institutions and armed factions. Yet 
the inverse also seems to hold: This contest for a role in local 
governance and a foothold in the service sector has been, for 
civilian administrators and militants, about serving Syrians.
Together, the efforts of these competing and overlapping 
service bodies have helped ensure that rebels have had 
somewhere worth fighting for; that they have been defending 
their home communities and an alternate political order, not 
simply waging a mountain insurgency. And these service 
projects have also given Idlibis experience organizing and 
governing themselves independently of the Assad regime, 
or really any larger political authority. The question now is 
how and whether these bodies survive continued war—
and, if the regime manages to retake some of these areas, 
whether it can reinstall its control over Idlibis who have, over 
five years, learned to rule themselves.
___________________________________________
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